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Abstract
Futures contracts are exchange-traded ﬁnancial instruments that enable parties to ﬁx a price in
advance, for later performance on a contract. Forward contracts also entail future settlement, but
they are traded directly between two parties. Futures and forwards are used in commodities
trading, as producers seek ﬁnancial security when planning production. We discuss the potential
use of futures contracts in Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) markets; concluding that they have
one principal advantage (near-term price security to current polluters), and one principal
disadvantage (a combination of high price volatility and high trade volume means contracts
issued by the private sector may cause systemic economic risk). Accordingly, we note the
potential for the development of futures markets in CDR, but urge caution about the prospects
for market failure. In particular, we consider the use of regulated markets: to ensure contracts are
more reliable, and that moral hazard is minimised. While regulation offers increased assurances,
we identify major insufﬁciencies with this approach—ﬁnding it generally inadequate. In
conclusion, we suggest that only governments can realistically support long-term CDR futures
markets. We note existing long-term CDR plans by governments, and suggest the use of state-
backed futures for supporting these assurances.
1. Introduction
Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gases (GHGs—princi-
pally CO2) increase global temperatures. Atmospheric
CO2 persists for millennia [1]; it is principally a stock
problem, not a ﬂow problem.
Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) has been widely
discussed, and can be considered a subset of
greenhouse gas removal (GGR) [2]. GGR additionally
includes e.g. methane (CH4). The Kyoto Agreement
deﬁnes Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) [3]. These are
not deﬁned for CO2 alone—and include other GHGs,
in amounts rendered equivalent by their Global
Warming Potential (GWP). The CDR/GGR distinc-
tion is relevant, for reasons of effect equivalence—
despite potentially signiﬁcant cost differentials. For
example, it may be cheaper to remove methane than
CO2 (taking into account their differing Global
Warming Potential [4]). Hence, it is necessary to
consider both GGR and CDR. As CDR is more the
widely used term, and is by far the largest component
of feasible GGR, we use CDR as our primary term in
this discussion1.
The economic performance of solutions to global
warming may be optimised by time-shifting CDR in
the medium term—to take advantage of anticipated
cost reductions. Thus, the recent Paris accord relies
heavily on Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs) to
deal with near-term emissions of CO2 in decadal
timescales, even as it envisions concurrent abatement
efforts [6].
We consider possibilities for the development of
futures markets for CDR/GGR, as novel technologies
tend to fall in price [7]. Many technologies (e.g. cell
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1 In our discussions of market design, we do not speciﬁcally
consider GGR as distinct from CDR, but include this deﬁnition for
completeness only as a CDR futures market could also provide a
platform for trading other GGR contracts on a far smaller scale in
the manner that the Chicago Board of Trade had, by the late
nineteenth century, developed as the most important exchange for
wheat futures trading, but also tradedmaize corn, oats, rye, or barley
in far smaller volumes. See [5].
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phones, computers, cars, telephones) went from being
the preserve of the rich to mass-market staples within
decades [8]. A survival bias exists: only successful
technologies fall sufﬁciently in price to promote
widespread adoption. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to
expect a technology-driven CDR price fall [9]. Given
an expectation of ongoing demand, a reasonable
investor may seek to sell CDR obligations today, and
assume the risk of delivering the technology at a lower
price tomorrow. The question is whether or not a
market for CDR futures is the most realistic way to
organise risk transfer, and, if not, what other options
exist.
Section 2 considers the operation of forward and
futures markets generally, with particular reference to
long-dated contracts. Section 3 discusses how amarket
for CDR futures could be organised, offering contract
examples. Section 4 considers scenarios for market
failure and possible regulatory responses. Section 5
offers some conclusions and possibilities for future
research.
2. Forward markets versus futures markets
Forward and futures contracts of are two kinds of
ﬁnancial instruments that ﬁx a price now for
performance in future, and provide convenient
vehicles for borrowing and lending within com-
modities markets [10]. Options contracts, contracts-
for-difference, and swap agreements also involve
future settlement, and represent alternative trade-
able instruments, involving many of the same
caveats, as well as some additional risks discussed
below. Carbon debt contracts offer another possible
solution, which we consider in section 3 [11]. Our
discussion in section 4 also applies to these
alternative market designs.
The paradigmatic contract is for the forward-sale
of a commodity product. Faced with uncertain market
prices, a farmer may seek to forward-sell agricultural
produce prior to production. This enables conﬁdent
calculation of margins—at least to the extent that
output can be predicted.
Risk transfer in both forward and futures markets
depends on participants’ beliefs about future market
prices during the life of the contract. In general, sellers
of a commodity use futures markets (in theory at least)
to transfer risk: reduce ﬁnancing costs; increase ability
to assuredly perform on business obligations; etc.
Simultaneously, these contracts offer wholesale man-
ufacturers a realistic hedging strategy against short-
term ﬂuctuations in rawmaterials prices. The farmer is
able to control the risk of lower grain prices in the
future, and the baker is able to control the risks
associated with rising prices. Both parties are able to
hedge their exposure to price movements. Alfred
Marshall summarised the social utility of such markets
with the pronouncement: ‘the hedger does not
speculate: he insures’ [12].
In practice, commodity futures do not always
adequately forecast prices, instead following a random
walk [13]. Therefore there is considerable empirical
disagreement about the value of futures contracts in
risk management. There is better evidence that
commercial ﬁrms use futures contracts as tools of
arbitrage and to reduce transaction costs [14].
Finance academics and practitioners also draw an
important distinction between primary and secondary
markets: primary markets are where buyers (or
investors) purchase ﬁnancial instruments from the
companies which issue them, whereas secondary
markets offer a way for buyers and sellers to trade
amongst themselves. Secondary markets consist of
diverse market participants with a range of motiva-
tions, including investors, speculators, hedgers and
arbitragers. They provide liquidity to purchasers of the
original instrument who may need or want to realise
the value of the contract immediately [15]. It is a well-
known belief in ﬁnance that the health of the primary
market depends on a robust secondary market [16].
Unlike bilateral forwards, futures are generally
exchange-traded. Exchanges impose margin require-
ments, and other rules and regulations. They usually
require maintenance of a deposit (typically 2% to
10%), to guard against the risk of non-performance.
Modern futures markets adjust deposits daily, to
maintain ‘mark-to-market’ requirements for re-valu-
ation as prices change. Large secondary markets exist
for many commodity futures. Grain contract futures
markets have been used extensively in the US since the
mid-19th century. Although futures contracts contin-
ue to be traded on regional exchanges even today, the
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) has conducted the
lion’s share of futures trading in corn and wheat from
the early 20th century onwards [17].
The role of exchanges as central clearing authori-
ties is an important feature of futures markets. The
seller of a service assumes their counterparty is able to
perform, but may face a situation where they have no
control of who that eventual counterparty actually is.
Accordingly, either the structure of the contract (by
way of a large and potentially extensible deposit) or
regulation of the market (by ensuring the ﬁnancial
capacity of trading parties) is required—to ensure that
there is indeed a valid counterparty in existence at the
time the contract falls due. The need to provide these
guarantees (i.e. a central clearing counterparty with
deep pockets), alongside the advent of electronic
trading, has driven the acquisition of exchanges by
large players such as the CME Group or Eurex [18].
The distinction between futures and forwards
turns on whether the contract is exchange-tradable
and whether or not it is cash-settled. A forward
contract ﬁxes the price and performance between two
parties, and generally involves physical delivery of the
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underlying asset, at least in commodity markets (as
distinct from formal commodity exchanges). A futures
contract is similar, but is traded on an exchange, and
may pass through many hands before falling due.
Modern commodities futures are solely ﬁnancial
instruments—they are only ever ‘cash settled’, not
delivered. This makes them less subject to market
abuse, e.g. price manipulation [19]. A futures
settlement is designed to restore the counterparty to
the same ﬁnancial position as would have been the
case had physical performance taken place.
Futures and forwards are designed to be functionally
equivalent fromtheoriginator’spointofview,butoperate
very differently on secondary markets. Easy trading of
futures, to allow economically-efﬁcient outcomes,makes
them an appealing instrument. However, forward
contracts can be privately traded, often via large dealer
networks. This achieves a similar result—albeit in a
riskier fashion, and with higher transaction costs.
Additional derivative products, including options,
contracts-for-difference, and swap agreements, histori-
cally developed alongside well-established futures mar-
kets;over time,optionsdealingmovedfromcurb-trading
(literally on the curb outside the exchange) onto
exchanges, while swap agreements and contracts-for-
difference have, until very recently, been traded almost
entirely over-the-counter (OTC) in bilateral agreements,
in a manner similar to forward contracts [20].
Because of the mechanics of settlement, exchange-
based trading in options contracts generally depends
upon a well-functioning futures market [21]. Options
create the right, not the obligation, to buy (a call
option) or to sell (a put option) an underlying asset at
a given strike price before a given expiration date.
These are cash-settled through the same mechanism
by which the clearinghouse settles futures contracts.
When a buyer exercises an exchange-tradeable call
option, the clearinghouse creates for her a ‘long’
futures position at the option strike price (i.e. causes
her to buy a futures contract); the exchange’s
clearinghouse, in turn, assigns a ‘short’ futures
position to the seller of an identical call option (i.e.
causes him to sell a futures contract). By contrast,
when a buyer exercises a put, he receives a ‘short’
futures position at the strike price, and the ‘long’
futures position is assigned to the seller of an identical
put [22]2. This mechanism ensures orderly settlement
and minimises counterparty risk. We fully expect that
options trading of this variety would develop as an
integral part of an exchange-traded CDR futures
market.
As the Financial Crisis of 2007–8 made clear, over-
the-counter trading in options and other derivatives is
especially sensitive to liquidity risks and to counter-
party default. Although the networks in which OTC
trading of ﬁnancial derivatives are conducted is
enormous, spanning the entire globe, these normally
deep liquidity pools are prone to both endogenous and
exogenous shocks that can halt trading or reduce it to a
minimum, as happened with credit default swaps on
mortgage-backed securities during the recent crisis
[23]. Because regulatory requirements require ﬁnan-
cial assets to be ‘marked-to-market’, the resulting ﬁre
sales caused catastrophic market failure [24]. In a
more localised way, the absence of transparency about
the ﬁnancial positions of market participants makes it
difﬁcult to discern possible incentives for default in
individual cases [25]. The empirical ﬁnance literature
shows that moving such derivatives onto exchanges
reduces both kinds of risks [26]. This is why there is a
regulatory consensus in favour of doing so.
Generally, futures are short-term contracts, by the
time frame of climate science. Agricultural examples
with periods over a year are unknown [27]. Long-
dated forwards were historically used in foreign
currency markets (now largely superseded by swap
agreements [28]); and in petroleum markets where
they are considered very risky [29].
In our CDR example, the purpose of the contract
would be to allow parties to take advantage of the shift
in price expected on long timescales (decadal)—
leading to an increased risk proﬁle.
Longer term ﬁnancial debt instruments exist (e.g.
mortgages, leases, government bonds). Mortgages and
leases are inherently backed by a tie to an underlying
asset. In the last ﬁnancial crisis, mortgages were
transformed into tradable securities (securitisation).
Absent such ﬁnancial engineering, mortgages are
difﬁcult to trade on secondary markets. They are not
fungible (neither the property, nor the borrower, is
exactly like any other); and liquidation costs are
signiﬁcant (via foreclosure). For government bonds,
the counterparty is the state—typically seen as one of
the most dependable ﬁnancial counterparties in the
developed world, which is why short-dated govern-
ment securities are considered to be the risk-free rate.
3. Possibilities for a CDR futures market
The investment challenge in CDR is not to predict
price direction (almost inevitably downwards), but to
determine the scale of the fall. In a competitive market,
too high a predicted price results in lost sales. In all
markets, too low a predicted price will result in
ﬁnancial losses fulﬁlling the contract.
For a buyer, such a transaction is beneﬁcial. A
seller of goods or services with a carbon impact could
fully mitigate resulting CO2 pollution with CDR
credits, bought on the futures market at the time of
sale or manufacture. These markets may generally
resemble the market for Voluntary Carbon Offsets
(VCOs) [30]. An alternative model for adoption, and
2 Here‘long’ and ‘short’ refer to buying (‘going long’) and selling
(‘selling short’), and do not refer to the term (long-dated or short-
dated) of the contract. This terminology is conventional, but may
confuse those who are not familiar with the language of ﬁnancial
markets.
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source of market demand, could be state-mandated
Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS), such as those
which have developed in the state of California, the
European Union and in China [31].
If there is a plan to rely on CDR as a least-cost
solution to the CO2 problem, it makes signiﬁcant
economic sense to defer consumption, in anticipation
of price falls. Reliable CDR futures offer a convenient
package to the buyer, allowing them to walk away with
clean hands from an otherwise dirty transaction.
We deﬁne our ideal transaction:
! A buyer seeks CDR, equivalent to pollution that
he has caused (or is economically responsible for)
—we take 1 tonne. Accordingly, he sets out to
purchase a commitment to remove 1 AAU from
the atmosphere by any satisfactory date—we take
30 years max. Finding that price for immediate or
near-term removal of CO2 are unacceptably high,
he instead looks to buy a contract for delivery at
a forward date, or to enter a cash-settled future
contract with equivalent ﬁnancial performance.
Provided that such a ‘satisfactory date’ contract
can be obtained at a lower price than the eco-
nomic beneﬁt from the emission of CO2 in the
present, it makes sense for a rational actor to
emit now and contract for future removal.
! A seller believes he can sell the services of 1 tonne
CDR to the buyer’s timescale, at a lower-than-
spot price. The seller will then seek to cash-settle
the future contract, on the assumption that tech-
nological progress will have made CDR cheaper
by the due date. The seller of the future will prof-
it from any anticipated price fall below the con-
tract price, whilst assuming the risk inherent in
that judgement.
! A producer is a ﬁrm which has, or that proposes
to build, CDR/GGR technology. Whilst such tech-
nology remains substantially speculative or experi-
mental, they would not be able to sell credits on
the futures market. However, when the technolo-
gy became ‘bankable’ (i.e. the technology risk is
assumed to be minimal), then they could start
selling contracts.
There is a beneﬁt to the producer in selling their
capacity in advance, but the main economically-active
party in the market is the seller—who takes a position
on the future price, and provides near-term economic
certainty by assuming the risks of such a price
judgement.
We do not consider the issue of veriﬁcation of
performance generally—instead assuming agreed
standards. We concern ourselves only with issues of
pricing, contracting, and risk—as regards perfor-
mance on these accepted obligations at future dates.
Notwithstanding the above, we suggest that reliable
contracts of this type would not be linked to biosphere
storage activities—such carbon storage is likely to be
too short-term to be a comprehensive solution to the
buyer’s CO2 emissions.
3 In contrast to the issues we
discuss, biomass carbon storage has a different range
of issues (e.g. growing time). These matters have been
extensively discussed in other literature, e.g. those that
deal with carbon banking and carbon debts [32].
Carbondebtmarkets are arguably better suited to the
needs of small-scale foresters, whose chief concerns are
smoothing cash ﬂows and minimising transaction costs
[33]. There is much lower technology risk in biological
storage methods (e.g. afforestation) than in the more
high-technologyCDRapproaches forwhich futureprices
can be expected to fallmore rapidly. For those engaged in
biological storage, the risks are primarily regulatory and
political, as climate policy depends both on international
agreements and domestic politics, such as the recent
American presidential election, which could lead to
abrogation of the Paris Agreements altogether by the
United States, and, in any case, will result in diminished
political will to support mitigation efforts [34]4. Policy
and regulatory risks could easily bankrupt small-scale
agricultural enterprises.
Encouraging afforestation projects and other
biological storage methods in the developing world
has been a priority of the World Bank, whose Pilot
Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change
Mitigation (PAF), which held came on-stream in July
2015 [35]. The PAF functions as a primary market for
tradeable put options, which are allocated via auctions
[36]. They have a target market capitalisation of
$100 million U.S. dollars and offer an important
model for international cooperation in the design of
global CDR markets [37].
The scale and volume of CDR markets envisioned
by the terms of the Paris Agreements, which anticipate
the near-term development of Negative Emissions
Technologies, and the presence of agents, with
heterogeneous expectations about the rate of price
decline, suggest that futures markets (which would, in
all likelihood, also allow options trading) will be the
market design preferred by large-scale polluters and
ﬁnancial intermediaries. Financial ﬁrms and invest-
ment managers (including institutional investors like
pension funds, insurance companies, and endow-
ments) in particular would value secondary CDR
markets which provide vehicles for hedging risk
associated with possible equity investments in Nega-
tive Emissions Technologies [38]. This is particularly
true given the current tendency toward institution-
alisation and ﬁnancialisation in global capital markets
and the need for exchange-tradeable, standardised
contracts [39].
3 A properly designed and engineered geological CO2 reservoir is
assumed to be stable without maintenance on centurial timescales,
but changes in land use may occur and are difﬁcult to prevent.
4 At bare minimum, Trump’s election is expected to delay any
potential federal support for biological storage projects by an
election cycle.
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We do not consider in this paper how such
contracts may be obligated or used in practice. Those
are political questions not economic ones. These
contracts may be made on a voluntary basis—as are
modern VOC contracts, with varying motivations.
They may be made by obligation: by legal mandate, or
by supply-chain obligations (e.g. purchase of con-
struction concrete may oblige an offset of CO2 arising
from manufacture).
4. Market failures and regulatory responses
The superﬁcially appealing nature of CDR futures
disguises various complexities and signiﬁcant limita-
tions. They differ substantially from ordinary futures:
the role of buyers and sellers is reversed as regards risk.
In the classic farming example (save for insurable
crop failure) the assets covered by the contract will
certainly exist. The farmer has little opportunity to
renege on the contract, save for abandoning the farm
or selling the crops elsewhere—triggering sanctions.
In the CDR equivalent, there exists signiﬁcant
technology risk. Sellers may anticipate technology
that is not delivered. It may be late, fail to work as
expected, or may simply be far more expensive than
predicted. This technology risk adds to conventional
counterparty risks. A CDR futures market would
suffer signiﬁcant (uninsurable) external risks, greater
than those typical in conventional commodity
markets. By contrast, the corn prices are unaffected
by technology change, within a growing season.
Additionally, there exists a regulatory dimension to
technology risk. CDR producers may be willing to
provide at the price agreed, but may be prevented from
so doing. For example, the inexpensive strategy of
Ocean Iron Fertilisation (OIF) [40] is controversial
[41], and may be prohibited. Likely, Direct Air
Capture (DAC) [42] will be signiﬁcantly more
expensive than changes in land use. It may therefore
be possible for a provider to perform technologically
and economically, but impossible from a regulatory
viewpoint. The resulting (assumedly unexpected)
price shift may render the seller entirely incapable
of meeting their contractual obligations.
We can compare the futures market for CDR
services with other markets in which such contracts
could conceivably be used. Moore’s law [43] suggests
reliable increases in compute capability over time. A
reasonable investor may determine that he can reliably
contract to provide compute capability at any price
above that predicted by Moore’s well-tested law.
Accordingly, the level of risk would be modest.
By contrast, the capacityof skilled investors to predict
future prices of CDR is limited by the early development
state of the technology. Historical data on which to base
any assumptions of future price falls is sparse.
Two factors are likely to have an overwhelming
inﬂuence on technology costs in CDR (as distinct from
regulatory costs). These are ﬁrstly time, and secondly
deployment scale.
Considering time: a varied suite of CDR-enabling
technologies is expected (e.g. surplus solar energy for
DAC, improved seismic surveying for CO2 storage).
The development of these technologies is likely to be
largely decoupled from CDR itself, and thus ‘sitting
and waiting’ may result in large price falls. We
acknowledge the varying stage of development for
differing technologies, but note that none have been
decisively tested at scale as a complete system. Noting
the use of CO2 burial, such as in enhanced oil recovery,
the production component for a pure CO2 stream
remains challenging. For example, in Bio-Energy with
Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), difﬁculties
remain in sustainability supplying a suitable feed
stock, without excessive supply chain emissions,
ecosystems impacts, food crop competition, or
GHG production arising from land use change [44].
Deployment scale is a more mercurial factor.
Steady increases in production volume are one of the
surest indications of forthcoming cost falls, as internal
and external economies of scale take hold in an
industry (an ‘experience curve’ or ‘learning curve’)
[45]. However, futures contracts are ordinarily subject
to performance at an agreed time, not an agreed
market volume. Accordingly, it is challenging to
predict the complex interplay between time, scale and
price. If a futures provider assumes rapid deployment,
he may be forced to perform at a far higher price than
predicted. By contrast, an unduly cautious seller may
overprice CDR futures, assuming slack demand
keeping prices high. He would make a large margin
—but on a low volume of sales. In a competitive
market, he may simply be outbid.
Total market proﬁts are scale-linked. Low-cost
abatement implies almost no demand for high-priced
CDR. Accordingly, there is little or no value in CDR
markets at small scale, as no signiﬁcant scarcity
premium is available. A strong investment case
requires an assumption of scale. Buyers will inevitably
select providers with the most optimistic models of
future scaling. Furthermore, investors may be
attracted to ﬁrms whose projections are similarly-
optimistic. There exists a potential risk of Darwinian
selection for delusion and denial among service
providers. Firms making hubristic predictions may be
the only ones able to attract buyers or investors. This
poses extreme risks: not only for the sector; but also
to the wider economy, due to the potential size of the
market.
The issue of performance risk is fundamental to
the success or failure of the CDR futures concept. Were
CDR futures to be a small ﬁnancial market, market
risks could be contained—but they would have failed
as a political instrument. Only a large market is
capable of exerting any meaningful inﬂuence on the
climate problem. Accordingly, market risk appraisal
must include an assumption of scale.
Environ. Res. Lett. 12 (2017) 015003
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At scale, the challenge becomes one of reliable
performance. In conventional futures, a deposit
guarantees performance. Assuming a pumpkin is $1
þ/# 20c, a deposit of 40c guarantees performance.
Even a contract which assumes the highest price, but
ﬁnds the lowest, does not incentivise a buyer to renege.
CDR futures may face dramatically higher price
uncertainty. Favoured technologies may turn out to be
late, over-priced, unsafe, or prohibited. With steep
expected falls in price, and long timescales to
performance, such uncertainty may result in a
prohibitive deposit. With $20–$60 per ton CO2, risk
assumed is $40. This would require the seller deposit of
$40 on a contract that may be sold for as little as $20.
Not only is this cost-prohibitive; but in a primitive
market (i.e. without escrow), a bad-faith buyer may
purchase contracts, pocket the deposit, and walk away.
This mandates a central clearinghouse, as found in
modern futures markets.
Escrow does not solve the problem of the contract
requiring a deposit far greater than expected margins
—which must be lodged for decades. This is a wholly
unrealistic contractual form.
Existing futures markets generally use frequent
margin calls (e.g. daily), to ensure liquidity. This is a
market structure that functions well for markets that
have a range of characteristics typical of ordinary
commodities markets:
! Fluctuating prices
! Modestly sized, compared to the global economy
! Short-dated contracts
By contrast, markets for CDR/GGR have different
characteristics
! Expected falling spot prices, during the life of the
contract
! Large compared to the global economy
! Long-dated contracts
An alternative strategy for controlling perfor-
mance is market regulation. The insurance market
closely parallels a potentially-attractive structure for
the CDR futures market. In insurance, everyday risks
(burglary, house ﬁre) can be borne by a single ﬁrm.
With a sufﬁcient stock of policies, such risks become
highly predictable. The insured essentially pays to
convert an unpredictable cost (a burglary) into a
predictable one (a premium). Large-scale or systemic
risk (hurricanes, ﬂoods and earthquakes) place the
insured and insurer in more similar positions—as
major losses may occur across the portfolio. Accord-
ingly, insurance ﬁrms need their own insurance. Such
‘catastrophic risk’ insurance is sold around the
reinsurance market, to replicate the experience
enjoyed by the householder in the ﬁrst example—
risk reduction, for a reasonable price. Reinsurers
carefully balance their portfolios; storms do not strike
all possible cities in any given year.
By contrast: as a commodity, CDR creates identical
risks across the whole market simultaneously. Many of
these risks are regulatory, which in turn are difﬁcult to
hedge or insure against and could result in catastroph-
ic market failure [46]. Furthermore, if one CDR future
fails due to the unavailability of critical enabling
technology, failure of many others is also possible.
More likely, since CDR futures would be based on
different technologies, the effects of technological
failures would be reﬂected in pricing. This becomes a
question of the scale of the effect. If sellers assumed a
CDR cost of $40 ton from producers, a price of $41
may be catastrophic for some, but survivable for most.
By contrast, a price of $50 would likely cause a wave of
corporate failures, sufﬁcient to impact on the wider
economy. A price of $200/ton would be simply
undeliverable.
Two factors combine to increase market risks:
‘selection pressure’, when only the most bullish ﬁrms
attract investors and customers; and duplicitous
behaviour from ‘bad actors’. Managers and share-
holders of ﬁrms providing CDR services on a futures
contract may be either take reckless risks (morale
hazard), or may wilfully sign contracts that are actively
fraudulent (moral hazard)—having no intention to
ever deliver on them [47]. These potential issues
present major risks to the development of a healthy
and functional market in CDR futures.
With inherently precarious markets, regulators
face a difﬁcult balancing act: growth is vital, but
encourages systemic risks (climate and economic)
which cannot be easily mitigated.
The regulator may also verify CDR performance
and standards. Brieﬂy: CDR techniques vary widely in
side-effects and risks:
! Environmental impact—Some are benign (e.g.
DAC); others disrupt ecosystems (e.g. OIF).
! Long-term risk—Enhanced weathering [48] offers
reliable storage; shallow storage of pressurized
CO2 (after DAC) risks leaks [49].
! Biological techniques (e.g. afforestation) typically
result in temporary storage of CO2 (e.g. a century)
[50].
Beyond the strict conﬁnes of CDR, further
complexities exist in the wider GGR ﬁeld.
Accordingly, we note generally that CDR is far
from being a homogenous market. For CDR were
reduced to a commodity, effort would have to
be invested to ensure the bona ﬁde of credits. Further,
use of GGR as a substitute for CDR would sensibly be
the subject of additional regulation, both on equiva-
lence and on environmental impact. This will further
increase a demanding regulatory burden. Creating
Environ. Res. Lett. 12 (2017) 015003
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separate regulators for veriﬁcation and futures issues
may be merited—although resulting interplay makes
independence a major challenge to successfully
implement—with ‘ﬁnger pointing’ a likely result of
any market failures.
A range of possible interventions exist for a
market-only regulator:
Contract length—Longer contracts are riskier. Long-
term price predictions depend not only on foresee-
able technology risks (over time, these become less
‘noisy’—but larger), but also on societal risks
(which generally increase over time). In the absence
of an established cost curve, the capacity of any
ﬁrm to make predictions about society, politics,
economics, etc. on a timescale of decades is highly
questionable.
Resource—regulators may seek to place limitations
on the parties eligible to transact, or at least to their
underwriters. Obvious candidate underwriters are
major ﬁnancial institutions and reinsurers. However,
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 has shown clearly that
blue-chip institutions are vulnerable to unexpected
collapse. The instability resulting leads government
to support institutions deemed ‘Too Big To Fail’—
offering supposedly private markets de facto state
underwriting protection (essentially a socialisation
of risk, and a privatisation of proﬁt—a classic mar-
ket failure).
Transparency—regulators may concern themselves
with business models, not just transactions. Similar
restrictions exist in the banking sector (e.g. capital
adequacy requirements) [51]. Detailed scrutiny of
cost models and delivery plans may be merited.
A mosaic of the above approaches may be
expected, and we have argued separately that there
is a role for emerging blockchain technology in solving
problems associated with contract lengths and
transparency with respect to market participation
[52].
A regulated market offers potential beneﬁts.
However, inherent risks exist in relying on a futures
market for technologies which are: rapidly falling in
price; and have the potential to destabilise the global
economy.
Current futures contracts are typically shorter-
term, and are used in markets with a much higher
degree of price certainty. It is unclear whether a
regulatory structure can be developed which allows the
inherent disadvantages of a private-sector CDR futures
market to be overcome.
By contrast, we note recent international agree-
ments mandating CDR in the long term. We also note
the high levels of trust investors afford long-dated
government bonds—even those that represent a
signiﬁcant fraction of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). We consequently suggest that government-
backed CDR futures would be a reasonable and
credible instrument, attracting market conﬁdence.
Indeed, without such a contractual instrument in
place, government commitments to CDR may lack
assured delivery.
5. Conclusions
Futures represent an attractive and useful instrument
for the circumstances of CDR: i.e. a nascent
technology, with a long-term need for future
deployment in a remedial capacity. Sellers of CDR
futures would be able to beneﬁt from price falls
resulting from technological development. Buyers
would gain near-term price certainty; and, in some
circumstances, favourable pricing compared with
mitigation. Signiﬁcant microeconomic beneﬁts result:
large cost reductions; certainty increases; and conse-
quential improvements to welfare.
However, the nature of CDR futures makes the
creation of self-regulating contract forms inherently
difﬁcult. Long durations, and large price uncertainties,
make unregulated CDR futures unenforceable. There-
fore, a regulator is required: to ensure the capability of
parties to futures contracts; and/or to ensure and
control deposits.
Furthermore, CDR futures are a potentially very
large market—necessarily so, to beneﬁt the climate.
Therefore, macroeconomic and systemic factors must
be considered. Whilst the above microeconomic
advantages offer potentially large macroeconomic
beneﬁts in aggregate (based on the large market size),
there is an inherent risk that CDR futures may be
under-priced by the private market—and indeed there
is ‘selection pressure’ for such market failure to occur.
A small under-price will simply result in the loss of
expected proﬁt by the sellers, or perhaps a net ﬁnancial
loss. By contrast, a large under-price may result in the
bankruptcy of the ﬁrms obligated to deliver on the
contract. In this scenario, the contracts may be ignored
—resulting in a large loss of utility to society. Any
attempts to enforce under-priced contracts may result
in a series of major company collapses, and generalised
ﬁnancial crisis akin to the events of 2007–8.
Controlling these market risks will properly be the
concern of any legitimate regulator—but capacity to
do so does not necessarily result from desire alone.
Accordingly, we identify a high risk of moral and
morale hazard, and suggest the need for cautious
market regulation. However, we note the inherent
limitations of a regulatory approach to addressing
market failure: price uncertainties, and large trading
volumes, tend to impose systemic risks on society. We
therefore ﬁnd generally that encouraging long-term
private-sector futures contracts is at best risky; and at
worse reckless, or even malfeasant.
Accordingly, we suggest only the use of govern-
ment-backed CDR futures to support any state
Environ. Res. Lett. 12 (2017) 015003
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obligations under climate treaties. In practical terms,
this would closely approximate to a carbon tax, with
the state agreeing to fund matched CDR services at a
future date.
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